The current study explored causal language in 3.5-to 4-year-old children by manipulating the type of agent (human acting intentionally or unintentionally, or inanimate object) and the type of effect (motion or state change) in causal events. Experiment 1 found that the type of agent, but not the type of effect, influenced children's production of causal language. Children produced more causal language for intentionally caused events than for either unintentionally-or object-caused events, independent of the type of effect. Experiment 2, which tested children's judgments of descriptions for the events, found a similar pattern. Children preferred causal descriptions more for the intentionally caused events than the unintentionally-and the object-caused events. Experiment 3 found no evidence of bias in children's non-linguistic representations of the events. Taken together, these results suggest an intention-to-CAUSE bias in children's mapping of conceptual representations of causality into linguistic structure. We discuss the implications of these results for the acquisition of causal language and for the development of conceptual representations of causality.
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Introduction
Human adults have the remarkable ability to represent the causal structure of a seemingly infinite set of events. Adults can reason about the effects of their own actions and about the effects of other people's actions. Furthermore, when making causal judgments, the intention of the agent is of no consequence -regardless of whether a person intentionally turned off the television or unintentionally sat down on a remote control, adults will still judge that the person caused the television to turn off. Additionally, causal reasoning is not restricted to judgments about human agents -adults are equally capable of causally reasoning about the effects of both animate and inanimate objects -and adults can causally reason about many types of effects, such as object motion, lights turning off, balloons popping, or plant growth. Thus, causal representations extend to a wide range of events -events that crosscut conceptual classes.
The breadth and apparent intricacy of causal reasoning in adults poses a fundamental question concerning the developmental origin of this vast capacity in human cognition. Are human infants and young children able to reason causally about a wide variety of events (Gopnik et al., 2004) ? Or, is causal reasoning initially biased towards a certain class of events, such as events of motion (Michotte, 1963) or events involving animate agents acting intentionally (Piaget, 1954) ? If early causal representations emerge from a restricted class of events, then biases may not only emerge in the way young infants represent causal events, they may also emerge in the way older children use causal language, since linguistic representations interact with non-linguistic representations early in development (e.g., Bloom, 1973; Clark, 2004; Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Mandler, 1992; Slobin, 1973 Slobin, , 1985 . Specifically, children may show a bias to map a certain class of events (e.g., motion events, intentional events) more often into causal linguistic structures than other classes of events.
